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Abstract
The question of what counts as good 
education research has received a 
great deal of attention, but too often it 
is conceived principally as a method-
ological question rather than an ethi-
cal one. Good education research is 
a matter not only of sound procedures 
but also of beneficial aims and results; 
our ultimate aim as researchers and 
educators is to serve people’s well-be-
ing. For their research to be deemed 
good in a strong sense, education re-
searchers must be able to articulate 
some sound connection between their 
work and a robust and justifiable con-
ception of human well-being. There 
is a good deal of history and conven-
tion against such a conception of re-
searchers’ work. We need to consider 
the conditions needed if that concep-
tion is to be realized. Among the con-
ditions is a concerted and cooperative 
endeavor for moral education among 
researchers and the people with whom 
they work—a context where questions 
of wellbeing are foregrounded, wel-
comed, and vigorously debated. 
The question of what counts as good education research has been debated for a long time and 
still concerns researchers. The ques-
tion can be posed at a philosophical 
level, as in the debate about the episte-
mological merits of quantitative as op-
posed to qualitative research, and at a 
more particular level,  where the issue 
is the quality of a particular research 
project. Recently, the No Child Left 
Behind Act (NCLB) has intruded the 
U.S. federal government into the mat-
ter with its de facto definition of good 
research as consisting of experimental 
studies that yield prescriptions for ac-
tion. This definition provides special 
political and professional urgency (at 
least for the near future) to the need 
for education researchers to ponder 
and speak out on the question of what 
constitutes good research. 
However, I do not dwell on NCLB 
here. It is but a recent manifestation of 
how the question of good research can 
be framed too narrowly, a frame that 
I fear education researchers sometimes 
fall into. This narrowness can come 
from confining questions of “good” es-
sentially to the methodological realm: 
“Good” research has an appropriate 
number of subjects to survey or inter-
view, yields reproducible results or 
provides for independent review of 
qualitative data, and so on. One can 
criticize NCLB because good research 
need not be experimental; but such a 
response, while legitimate, keeps de-
bate at the methodological level. What 
is sacrificed is adequate attention to 
the question of what good comes from 
educational policies and practices, 
how they do or do not contribute to 
the well-being of students, teachers, 
and communities. 
However, the problem of narrow-
ness is not limited to researchers who 
are fixated on methodology. Research-
ers genuinely concerned for well-be-
ing can be too narrow if they do not 
appreciate the complexity of well-be-
ing and its pursuit (Hostetler, 1995). 
In this essay I propose that good re-
search requires our careful, ongoing 
attention to questions of human well-
being, and I urge education research-
ers to think about how to achieve the 
conditions under which that attention 
can flourish. 
Perhaps a couple warnings are in 
order before I begin to make my case. 
First, clearly I am not sanguine about 
the state of education research. I read-
ily grant that some number of my mis-
givings are based more on my per-
sonal experiences than on a thorough 
study of the state of education re-
search. I have read enough and talked 
enough to colleagues around the coun-
try to be confident that I am not to-
tally off-base. Yet my principal aim 
is to provoke thought and conversa-
tion about our work as education re-
searchers, not to analyze our research 
community. If it turns out that my ex-
periences are unique or that I am delu-
sional, so much the better. 
Second, my approach is rather ir-
reverent in places. I think that serious 
issues cannot be dealt with seriously 
unless we are willing to be playful 
with them. I apologize in advance if 
I offend some readers. But, in my de-
fense, I appeal to Benjamin Barber 
(1992), who argues that all good teach-
ing is offensive, and to Maxine Greene, 
whom I heard say that the point of 
philosophy is to “keep the pain alive.” 
So look at this essay as an experiment 
on whether being annoying is just 
what a good teacher and philosopher 
ought to do. 
What’s the Problem? 
Over the past decade or so, in the 
pages of Educational Researcher and 
elsewhere, we have seen the question 
of good education research explored in 
terms of quantitative and qualitative 
methodologies. These debates have 
been valuable for helping us to think 
about the nature and aims of education 
research. They have raised important 
ethical questions about how research-
ers should understand and work with 
the human beings they study. The dan-
ger is that the debate can be limited to 
methodology. It would be like debat-
ing how we should research the effec-
tiveness of thumbscrews as a means 
of torture. A quantitative researcher 
might say we need a random sample 
of subjects and some quantifiable mea-
sure of results, say the pitch and dura-
tion of victims’ shrieks. A qualitative 
researcher could retort that such data 
Published in Educational Researcher 34:6 (August/September 2005), pp. 16-21; doi: 10.3102/0013189X034006016  
Published by SAGE Publications on behalf of American Educational Research Association. Used by permission.
What Is “Good” Education Research? 
Karl Hostetler  
Wh at Is  “Go o d”  Ed u c at I o n RE s E a R c h?  17
are inadequate, and might want to in-
terview the victims to get a thicker and 
richer narrative of their experience and 
its meaning for them. Of course, we 
might realize that we do not have an 
either–or choice here. We say that both 
approaches, or some “multimethods” 
approach, can provide useful data to 
theorists and practitioners of torture. 
The point of my admittedly naughty 
example is not to disparage quantita-
tive and qualitative methodologies or 
methodological debates. However, I 
do disparage blindness to, or lack of in-
terest in, the question of how research 
serves people’s well-being. Good re-
search is a matter not only of sound 
procedures but also of beneficial aims 
and results. Our ultimate aim as re-
searchers and practitioners is to serve 
people’s wellbeing— the well-being of 
students, teachers, communities, and 
others. Education research can have a 
profound impact on people’s well-be-
ing. A cynic might reply, “Well, then, 
thank goodness no one pays atten-
tion to education research.” Of course, 
whatever the truth of that, it does not 
let us off the ethical hook. And in addi-
tion to obligations to others, research-
ers have an ethical obligation to them-
selves. Call it an issue of integrity or 
identity. Education researchers have a 
right and an obligation to understand 
what they are doing, to stand for some-
thing worthwhile that gives their per-
sonal and professional lives meaning, 
and to articulate that thing to them-
selves and others. 
Readers might chafe at my sugges-
tion that researchers are blind to issues 
of wellbeing. I certainly do not sug-
gest that questions of human well-be-
ing have not been addressed, and ad-
dressed well, in education research. I 
do question, though, whether concern 
for those questions is as ubiquitous 
and serious as it needs to be. 
For example, many people vigor-
ously promote good-sounding slogans 
such as “All children can learn” and 
“Leave no child behind.” Yes, all chil-
dren can learn, but as Noddings (1992) 
points out, what the sloganeers often 
ignore is the question, “Learn what?” 
The assumption tends to be that the 
“what” is some form of liberal educa-
tion, but Noddings argues against a lib-
eral education, at least as it is construed 
traditionally. And about leaving no 
child behind, if we are herding the lem-
mings toward the cliff, I am not sure 
we do the laggards a favor by making 
sure they keep up with the pack. Good-
sounding slogans are no substitute for 
genuine ethical understanding of the 
ends we are trying to achieve. 
Good intentions do not guaran-
tee good research. However, my ar-
gument does not hinge on the exis-
tence of bad research. Researchers may 
well be able to make a sound case for 
the ethical value of their research; but 
my argument is that they do need to 
be able to make that case. And that is 
where my doubts lie. Researchers are 
expected to be knowledgeable and ar-
ticulate regarding the processes of re-
search. I am not sure there are simi-
lar expectations regarding the ethical 
ends of research—expectations that re-
searchers be knowledgeable and artic-
ulate regarding human well-being. 
I propose that, if their research to 
be deemed good in the fullest sense, 
education researchers must be able to 
make sound and articulatable, if not 
fully articulated, connections to a ro-
bust and justifiable conception of hu-
man well-being. I choose my words 
carefully. Stating the proposal this 
way allows for stronger and weaker 
senses of good research. I think we 
have to acknowledge that research can 
be good in the relevant sense without 
the researcher’s really understanding 
that it is good. But that is a weak sense 
of good research. I urge that we work 
toward a stronger sense of good re-
search, requiring researchers not only 
to serve well-being but also to under-
stand how they are serving it (or not). 
So, what is there to understand? 
“Wellbeing” itself is a difficult con-
cept. Philosophers debate whether it 
is essentially a state of mind, a state of 
affairs, or a melding of both. Is a stu-
dent doing well if she thinks she is 
succeeding in math even if she is not? 
Is she doing well if she is succeeding 
but gets no pleasure from it or affirma-
tion? If state of mind is important, then 
what state of mind is important? Plea-
sure? Satisfaction? Pride? Is success an 
important state of affairs? What does 
“success” mean? The complexity of the 
concept does not preclude our making 
legitimate judgments about a person’s 
well-being (Griffin, 1986), but it should 
keep us from being complacent about 
our understanding of well-being and 
the goods that contribute to it. 
At the same time, how far must we 
go with skepticism? Thumbscrews are 
one thing, but must we really take se-
riously the idea that educational aims 
such as teaching math or reading or 
character, or assessing students’ learn-
ing, or preparing preschoolers for 
school, or promoting young people’s 
health, need to be questioned for their 
contributions to wellbeing? Yes, we re-
ally must take that idea seriously, and 
for two basic reasons: the complexity 
of goods, and the complexity of a good 
human life. 
The Complexity of Goods 
One reason that educational aims 
must be researched is that the concepts 
we use to articulate educational aims 
typically are contestable. What does 
it mean “to read” or “to learn” or “to 
prepare”? 
Consider the notion of charac-
ter. One of the more popular charac-
ter education programs is “Character 
Counts.” This program posits six “pil-
lars” of character: trustworthiness, re-
spect, responsibility, fairness, caring, 
and citizenship. Deborah Meier (1995) 
offers a rather different view. For her 
it is essential that students learn to be 
observant, playful, skeptical, imag-
inative, respectful of evidence, able 
to communicate, caring, and possess 
a good work ethic (p. 170). There is 
overlap between the two perspectives. 
Both mention caring, for example, and 
Meier clearly ties her traits to the de-
mands of citizenship. However, there 
are various ways to manifest care and 
citizenship, and, although I will not 
fully argue the point here, I suggest 
that Meier’s conception is rather differ-
ent from what is emphasized in “Char-
acter Counts.” We at least get a sug-
gestion of that if we focus on items in 
Meier’s list such as skepticism, regard 
for evidence, and playfulness. Imag-
ine a school that encouraged students 
to be skeptical about school rules or a 
teacher’s ideas, to play around with 
alternatives, to demand evidence for 
why things should be as they are. Per-
haps Meier’s virtues are consistent 
with “Character Counts” “pillars,” but 
it is significant that they are made ex-
plicit and placed at the forefront. 
John Dewey (1909) offers a still dif-
ferent view. Virtues that he considers 
essential are force of character, judg-
ment, and responsiveness. Students 
need to be willing and able to stand for 
something, while using good judgment 
about when and how to do so and be-
ing willing and able to activate their 
“force” and judgment because they 
are sensitive to the people and events 
about them that call for a response. 
What I note here is that Dewey does 
not see character as a matter of some-
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how “possessing” traits such as “re-
spect” or “care”; for Dewey, virtue is 
shown in action, and situations and the 
actions that they call for typically are 
complex. Simple prescriptions about 
being respectful or caring or whatever 
just do not get us very far. Again, if we 
imagine a school where students are 
encouraged to respond to their whole 
surroundings, to take stands (perhaps 
against adults), and to exercise their 
own judgment, I think we get a very 
different picture of character. 
My concern here is not to defend 
or attack any particular conception 
of character. My point is that even an 
“obvious” good such as character mer-
its careful scrutiny. At stake are quite 
different conceptions of that part of a 
good human life. 
The Complexity of a Good Life 
A second reason for taking the ques-
tion of good seriously is that, even if 
some educational aim is found to be 
good, it constitutes only one good. But 
human well-being is complex. Rarely 
do good things come without some sort 
of cost or tradeoff. Academic achieve-
ment, whatever that is, may be good, 
but at what cost? Is it really worth the 
cost of cutting art, music, recess, and 
other supposed “extras”? I am pretty 
sure that Meier and Dewey would say 
no. People tend to just assume that “the 
basics” are reading, writing, and arith-
metic. Plato, however, argued that 
gymnastics and music are basic, stress-
ing the fundamental value of move-
ment and harmony of the body and 
soul. Granted, that was some 2,500 
years ago, but I have to think that we 
might benefit from greater concern for 
soul even nowadays. 
Or how about reducing school vi-
olence? That is a good thing, we can-
not deny. But again, at what cost? 
Proponents of character education 
sometimes try to justify their programs 
by offering data that incidents of vio-
lence decline in schools that have such 
programs. What they tend not to look 
at are other attendant outcomes. Are 
students also discouraged from exer-
cising force of character and judgment, 
the principal if implicit virtue stressed 
being mere obedience? It is far from 
obvious that having a safe school is in-
consistent with Deweyan virtues, as 
the example of Meier’s school shows. 
Following Martha Nussbaum 
(1990), what these issues demand of 
researchers is “vision” that they be 
“finely aware and richly responsible”: 
We live amid bewildering com-
plexities. Obtuseness and re-
fusal of vision are our beset-
ting vices. Responsible lucidity 
can be wrested from that dark-
ness only by painful, vigilant ef-
fort, the intense scrutiny of par-
ticulars. Our highest and hardest 
task is to make ourselves people 
on whom nothing is lost. (p. 148) 
The questions that researchers must 
face are difficult. I do not propose that 
the correct answers will become obvi-
ous if only we look hard enough. We 
should not always expect, or even de-
sire, unity of judgment. What we can 
and should expect, however, is unity 
in the belief that we as researchers 
have an obligation to ask these ques-
tions of ourselves and others, and to 
see that they are being answered well. 
(Re)Conceptualizing Researchers’ 
Work 
This orientation implies a particular 
conception of an education research-
er’s work, which I begin to articulate 
by contrasting it with some recent sug-
gestions by Labaree (2003) regarding 
how a researcher’s work differs from 
a teacher’s work. (My disagreements 
with Labaree may be more semantic 
than substantive, but I believe the is-
sues are important nonetheless.) Laba-
ree proposes several shifts that teach-
ers must undergo in their transition to 
researcher. I will consider two: from 
the normative to the analytical, and 
from the particular to the universal. 
Labaree is clear that researchers 
have, or can have, moral concerns. Still, 
he describes the transition from teacher 
to researcher as involving a shift from 
the normative to the analytical. I agree 
that some such shift may be appropri-
ate. For example, I can see the point 
that, “[p]osed with a situation in which 
two children are fighting in the back 
of the classroom, the scholar wants to 
ponder the social, psychological, eco-
nomic, and pedagogical reasons for this 
conflict, while the teacher wants to sep-
arate the combatants” (Labaree, p. 18). 
(However, I also think the separation of 
roles should not be overdrawn. Teach-
ers can and should analyze classroom 
situations, and I hope that research-
ers would be ready to step in to stop a 
fight.) However, I would describe the 
shift as one within rather than away from 
the normative realm. The shift may be 
from more immediate, less explicitly 
analytical normative concerns to less 
immediate, more explicitly analytical 
concerns—but this is a shift in the way 
that the normative is served. The ulti-
mate concern still is, or should be, nor-
mative. What if we can explain a class-
room fight in terms of some sort of 
socioeconomic class conflict; a poor kid 
resents a rich kid. But what does that 
really explain? Why should class differ-
ences generate resentment? Something 
vital is left out if we cannot embed the 
analysis within a realm of normative 
factors, such as a human being’s desire 
for dignity and a fair chance at a good 
life. Analysis may be inspired by moral 
concerns, and it may be used to serve 
moral concerns, but even more than 
that, it is itself a moral activity, a form of 
practical philosophy (Carr, 2003). Inevi-
tably, education research has moral im-
plications. The choice for researchers is 
whether they will give voice to those 
implications or remain silent about 
them. 
I have similar concerns about Lab-
aree’s shift from particular to univer-
sal, which I need to address, given my 
belief about the importance of “intense 
scrutiny of particulars.” Again, there 
may be some point in such a shift. 
Rightly, researchers are concerned 
about developing generalizations and 
theories. Indeed, inquiry into human 
well-being can and does lead to gen-
eralizations about what a good hu-
man life entails (as in Nussbaum, 2000) 
and can therefore help us to under-
stand what may be good for any par-
ticular person. But here, too, I am un-
easy about speaking in terms of a shift 
away from the particular instead of a 
shift to a different way of serving the 
particular. Perhaps the danger is most 
obvious in research using randomized 
populations. 
The basic idea there is to make ir-
relevant the influence of at least some 
particulars that might distinguish peo-
ple one from another. That can have 
some virtue, but it can also have the 
vice of suppressing just those par-
ticular factors and experiences that 
are essential to individuals’ well-be-
ing. Imagine research that establishes 
a strong positive correlation between 
some teaching approach and students’ 
success in reading (however that might 
be defined), irrespective of students’ 
particular backgrounds. That can be 
valuable information; yet something 
is missing if the research is silent on 
what happens to particular students. 
We find a way to improve students’ 
reading. Okay, but was it worth it? 
What were the costs, the tradeoffs? 
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Did some kids enjoy the curriculum 
and the instruction? Were some miser-
able? Resistant? If the emerging theory 
is not somehow addressing, or at the 
very least acknowledging, the com-
plexity of ethically relevant particulars 
that affect the well-being of particular 
persons, the moral task is incomplete. 
I am well aware that adopting such 
a conception of researchers’ work might 
necessitate some dramatic changes re-
garding how research is done, how stu-
dent researchers are educated, how dif-
ferent sorts of research are rewarded, 
and so on. For example, when research-
ers are attuned to particulars, clearly 
the scope and complexity of their re-
search expand. A higher-education cul-
ture that values quantity of publica-
tions might not be especially hospitable 
to such research. The conception of re-
search attuned to particulars also sug-
gests how vital it can be for research-
ers to have partners, such as teachers in 
classrooms, who can offer insights into 
particulars because of their intimate in-
volvement with students, parents, and 
others—an intimacy that is difficult for 
researchers to achieve. 
To move toward my proposed con-
ception of good research, we would 
need to address attitudes and concerns 
that challenge it. In the space allotted 
here, I cannot offer anything close to 
an adequate discussion of the impli-
cations of this conception; however, I 
will venture to note some of the basic 
issues involved and some basic condi-
tions needed for its realization. 
Conditions for Research Into 
Human Well-Being 
Can the Good Be “Researched”? 
One issue to face is a history of edu-
cation research during which questions 
of value have been marginalized. Lage-
mann (2000) describes how, early in the 
twentieth century, the desire to make 
the study of education more “scien-
tific” led to a separation of reason from 
value and so put value questions out 
of bounds. Academic philosophy no 
doubt abetted that move with logical 
empiricists’ conceptions of science and 
knowledge. Also, in philosophy, inter-
est in well-being waned, perhaps be-
cause of its connection to utilitarianism, 
which was falling out of favor. How-
ever, these trends have been reversed 
in recent decades. Philosophy of science 
has debunked the putative separation 
of reason and value. Human well-be-
ing again has become an issue for phil-
osophic inquiry (Griffin, 1986; Hurka, 
1993; Nussbaum & Sen, 1993; Raz, 1986; 
Sher, 1997; Sumner, 1996; Taylor, 1989; 
Warner, 1987; White, 1991). 
Nonetheless, the reason–value sep-
aration persists. For example, a danger 
I see in Labaree’s shift from the nor-
mative to the analytical is that it seems 
to suggest a separation between value 
and reason, even if implicitly and 
unintentionally. 
I have had students and colleagues 
state that inquiry into the good (and 
other philosophical issues) does not 
merit the status of “research,” be-
cause these issues are just “a matter of 
opinion” or merely “subjective.” Of-
ten, these claims rest on the existence 
of ethical controversies and disagree-
ments. But the mere fact of disagree-
ment does not entail the conclusion 
reached. For one thing, if disagree-
ment in some area showed that only 
“opinions” were involved, then sci-
ence, which is full of disagreements, 
would be a matter of opinion, too; but 
usually science is taken as the para-
digm of objectivity. 
In addition, we should not exagger-
ate the extent of disagreement about 
ethical issues. In the classes I teach, I 
prefer that students talk. Sometimes 
they are reluctant to do so. Usually, 
I do not resort to sticking them with 
cattle prods. I imagine most people 
would agree that this is a good policy. 
Now, the reply might be that sci-
ence nevertheless is different because 
it is based on facts and experiment. In 
language that is popular these days, 
one might ask, What is my “research 
base” to support not sticking students 
with cattle prods? 
If the demand is for data that 
show an experimental group of stu-
dents stuck with cattle prods talked 
no more than students in the control 
group, then I have no such data. My 
reply is that I need no such data and, 
in fact, would be pretty screwed up if 
I thought I did. To engage in ethical 
thought and action at all, one has to 
accept certain baseline commitments, 
such as respecting the dignity and hu-
manity of persons. 
Does that make ethics arbitrary or 
merely subjective? Hardly. But if we 
insisted that ethics was arbitrary be-
cause of that, we would have to con-
clude the same thing about science. 
One cannot do science without certain 
basic commitments such as respect for 
evidence and the value of simplicity 
and consistency in explanations. 
And if science has facts such as “the 
earth is spherical (roughly) and bil-
lions of years old,” so does ethics—
facts such as “it is wrong to cause gra-
tuitous pain” and “all people deserve 
a fair chance at a good life.” Of course, 
there might be people who deny those 
last two propositions. But then there 
are people who deny that the earth is 
spherical and ancient. In the latter case, 
we do not conclude, therefore, that the 
shape and age of the earth is all a mat-
ter of opinion; similarly in ethics. 
Also, if science has its experiments, 
so does ethics. Life is the laboratory 
for ethics. History and contemporary 
life offer a rich account of struggles, 
of successes and failures, of “experi-
ments,” in which human beings have 
sought to live lives that are worth-
while. Empirical evidence surely is rel-
evant to research into well-being. For 
example, in her research with women 
in India, Nussbaum (2000) found that 
the women aspired to many of the 
same things that people everywhere 
aspire to, things like the integrity of 
their bodies, health, and self-respect. 
Such findings are important for our 
understanding of human well-being. 
However, even though empirical 
findings are relevant to ethical ques-
tions, to engage with questions about 
well-being we must be clear about 
the necessity to go beyond the em-
pirical. In other words, good educa-
tion research requires philosophy, in 
particular moral theory. As the point 
sometimes is stated, “‘Is’ does not im-
ply ‘ought.’” Facts about the way the 
world is cannot tell us what we ought 
to do. If students responded well to 
cattle prods, it would not follow that 
they ought to be shocked. If children 
can learn the alphabet before enter-
ing school, it does not follow that they 
should. If abstinence-only sex educa-
tion programs were shown to reduce 
the teenage pregnancy rate more than 
other programs, that alone would not 
determine that those are the programs 
we should use. To each of those sce-
narios, we can and must say, “Okay, 
but how does that serve people’s well-
being?” And to answer that ques-
tion, we have to venture wide-eyed 
and strenuously into the “bewildering 
complexities” of human good. 
Freedom 
Many people get nervous when 
venturing into ethics, believing that 
decisions in that domain should be left 
to individuals. If we start raising ques-
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tions about what is good, visions of 
Puritans might start dancing in their 
heads. For instance, in response to the 
examples just noted, one might object: 
“But what if parents want their child to 
learn the alphabet in preschool or want 
an abstinence-only program?” Or, 
“What if faculty colleagues want to do 
such-and-such research? Who are we 
to say they shouldn’t?” 
These are important questions. We 
need to be clear that having moral con-
cern does not mean being moralistic 
and sanctimonious. Freedom is an im-
portant ethical and academic good and 
should not be infringed cavalierly. Of-
ten, maybe usually, we will not want 
to thwart people’s aims, even if we 
think them mistaken. Still, freedom is 
not an absolute good. Its value, like 
that of other goods, has to be judged in 
relation to its contribution to well-be-
ing. Our lives are full of legitimate in-
stances where our freedom is limited 
for the sake of others’ well-being and 
our own. And even if the goal should 
not be to thwart someone’s projects, 
we, as researchers and educators, have 
the right and indeed the obligation to 
raise questions when we see possible 
threats to well-being. 
Of course, I have found that merely 
raising questions is too much for some 
people. In higher education and else-
where, my experience is that ques-
tions often tend not to be welcomed, 
to put it mildly. It seems that to some 
people being questioned shows arro-
gance and/or lack of trust on the part 
of questioners. To some people, ques-
tioners are malcontents unwilling to be 
team players. But if that is the case, I 
would have to ask which is more arro-
gant: thinking there are complexities 
that need to be addressed, or think-
ing that one has all the right answers, 
trusting in oneself so much as to be 
immune to second thoughts? Who is 
a team player: someone who figures 
everyone should do whatever they 
feel like, or someone who tries to en-
gage with others in a common struggle 
to do what is best for the people they 
serve? And who is discontented if that 
project falls short? 
The Need for Moral Education 
What mechanisms are needed for 
the requisite questioning to occur? It 
could be pointed out that already there 
are mechanisms in place, notably insti-
tutional review boards (IRBs), which 
guard against harmful research. IRBs 
are indeed important, but preventing 
harmful research is not the same as pro-
moting good research; good research is 
not the same as nonharmful research. 
In addition, IRBs are concerned with 
the more obvious physical and emo-
tional harm that research subjects may 
suffer. However, what counts as an im-
portant harm or good may not be ob-
vious and may even be contentious. I 
do not propose that IRBs become arbi-
ters of these debates. Issues of well-be-
ing are too complex—and too impor-
tant—to be handed over to a small, 
select panel. What is needed is a con-
certed and cooperative endeavor for 
moral education among researchers, in 
collaboration with those with whom 
they work. 
This brings me to another objec-
tion that I sometimes hear from col-
leagues around the country or around 
the cooler. It goes something like this: 
“If people are bad, talking at them or 
having them take courses or having 
them read books is not going to reform 
them.” The observation is true, but it is 
a red herring. I return to Nussbaum’s 
vision metaphor. The presumption is 
not that people err with regard to well-
being because they are evil. We err be-
cause we overlook something, misper-
ceive something. All of us have blind 
spots. But we can improve our vision. 
And observing, arguing, reading, and 
thinking certainly have a role in help-
ing us achieve that. 
At the same time, “refusal of vi-
sion” certainly is possible. I myself 
have been around long enough to de-
spair of ever persuading some people 
to open their eyes. What we as a com-
munity of researchers can do, though, 
is begin to expect that from research-
ers. In our own institutions, with our 
students and faculty colleagues, we 
can begin to foreground issues of the 
good and hold people accountable to 
them. We can engage in serious con-
versation about well-being. 
Diversity and Community 
This communal inquiry needs a di-
versity of perspectives. Pursuit of well-
being is a broad enough and complex 
enough challenge that all sorts of re-
search have a place in it. As much as I 
urge researchers to be attentive to ques-
tions of well-being, I do not say that all 
researchers should always make those 
questions their immediate concern. 
And as much as I have stressed philos-
ophy, I am not saying that everyone has 
to read and know “philosophy.” Ques-
tions of human good are confronted in 
history, sociology, anthropology, re-
ligious studies, and other disciplines. 
And (and maybe I should not put this 
in print) philosophy, at least some sorts 
of philosophy, may not always be help-
ful for questions of well-being. That is 
why Nussbaum (1990), philosophical 
as she is, so often uses novels to explore 
human life. For education research-
ers who have not seen them, I would 
also recommend “The Simpsons” and 
“South Park” for explorations of philos-
ophy and human life. 
The point is, somewhere along the 
line researchers need to gain adequate 
awareness of, concern for, and un-
derstanding of issues of well-being. 
Even if their research is not immedi-
ately concerned with wellbeing, they 
need to understand how it is related to 
well-being. 
Knowing We Don’t Know 
Frankly, I wonder how many ed-
ucation researchers have that sort of 
understanding. I hasten to add that I 
am not condemning them for that; as 
I have noted, the culture of education 
research, at least in the past hundred 
years or so, has not emphasized such 
understanding. For example, when 
doctoral students are told to write lit-
erature reviews for their dissertations, 
I suspect that, often, they are not di-
rected to the sort of literature I am 
talking about. But that in itself is a rel-
atively minor problem. 
I turn to the German philosopher 
Hans-Georg Gadamer to suggest 
what is really essential. Gadamer 
(1960/1989) writes: 
Knowledge always means, precisely, 
considering opposites. Its superior-
ity over preconceived opinion con-
sists in the fact that it is able to con-
ceive of possibilities as possibilities. . 
. . [So] only a person who has ques-
tions can have knowledge. [How-
ever,] there is no such thing as a 
method of learning to ask questions, 
of learning to see what is question-
able. On the contrary, the example of 
Socrates teaches that the important 
thing is the knowledge that one does 
not know. (p. 365) 
I draw your attention to three ele-
ments of this passage. The first is the 
role of questions. As I have tried to 
show, the quest for well-being contin-
ually presents us with questions, with 
possibilities and opposites to consider. 
Even if we can get past the question of 
what is good, we must ask whether the 
good thing is good for these people, at 
this time, in this situation. 
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The second element regards “con-
ditions.” There is no method for learn-
ing to ask questions. Reading stuff 
might help, but not if it is used only 
to warehouse information. Conditions 
have to be such that reading and other 
activities lead to awareness of an ex-
panding horizon of unexplored terri-
tory, of ethical questions to be asked. 
There may be a number of condi-
tions needed for good research, but 
the third element I note is Gadam-
er’s (1960/1989) essential condition: 
knowledge that one does not know. If 
we consider the state of education re-
search, does it include knowledge that 
we do not know? We cannot look into 
people’s heads, but let us think about 
the conditions that education research-
ers find themselves in and ask whether 
knowing that one does not know is the 
sort of knowledge that is valued and 
encouraged. 
Of course, in some sense, all re-
search starts with a question, awareness 
that one does not know something. The 
problem is that research tends to end 
with an answer. Hello? Of course, I am 
not saying researchers should not try to 
answer questions. The problem is end-
ing with answers—being unaware of 
or uninterested in the ethical questions 
generated or avoided. The “answers” 
to research questions do not end things 
but offer new circumstances for explor-
ing the persistent question of what is 
good for people. 
Unfortunately, these days many 
people tend to want to end with an-
swers. Given the state of U.S. educa-
tion, with the attendant pressure to 
produce “results,” one can understand 
why people look for “answers.” And 
the problems are not limited to elemen-
tary and high school. For instance, one 
concern of mine is the increasing em-
phasis on grants in higher education. 
If we are not careful, winning grants 
will become an end in itself rather than 
a means to accomplishing something 
worthwhile. That is just one threat that 
I see in a general move toward a corpo-
rate model of higher education. 
Conclusion: Reasons for 
Optimism? 
To avoid a pessimistic conclusion, I 
will step out of character and conclude 
by proposing that we have reasons for 
optimism. I may be wrong about all of 
this. If so, I nevertheless hope to have 
presented issues worth thinking about. 
A philosophy professor of mine once 
described Bertrand Russell as one of 
the great philosophers of the 20th cen-
tury, then added that it was too bad he 
had been wrong about nearly every-
thing. I am not comparing myself to 
Bertrand Russell. But research that is 
wrong in its conclusions may still lead 
to progress. 
On the other hand, even if I am 
right, there is reason for optimism 
when we remember the extraordinary 
things that people have done to chal-
lenge the status quo and make life bet-
ter for their fellow human beings—
people like Mahatma Gandhi, Martin 
Luther King Jr., Mother Teresa, Des-
mond Tutu, and Martha Stewart. 
Well, maybe not Martha Stewart. And 
in education we have people such 
as Deborah Meier (1995), who have 
done remarkable things to show how 
schooling can be guided genuinely 
and successfully by an explicit ethical 
conception of what is good. 
But remember, too, that good 
things need not be extraordinary. It is 
in the power of every researcher and 
educator to do something to improve 
the lives of people. Progress is not al-
ways easy, of course. It requires un-
derstanding, commitment, compas-
sion, patience, and likely some amount 
of courage. 
As education researchers, we have 
a particular obligation and opportu-
nity to take a leading role in seeing 
that the research that is done is truly 
good research. As we do our work, 
we need to think beyond questions of 
how we will study students or ana-
lyze school policies: We need to think 
about how we can make life better for 
people. We need to think beyond our 
taken-for-granted ideas of well-be-
ing and what is good and make those 
ideas the objects of serious, communal 
inquiry. Serving people’s well-being 
is a great challenge, but it is also our 
greatest calling. 
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